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THE FINALITY OF MORAL JUDGMENTS:
A REPLY TO MRS. FOOTI

I

N A recent article,2 Philippa Foot has argued that, although
people talk about the "binding force" and "inescapability" of
morality-as contrasted with the "hypothetical" character of the .
rules of etiquette, club rules, and the like-it is very difficult to specifY
just what this could mean, other than that we simply have been taught
to feel that we cannot escape from the demands of morality. "[P]erhaps
it makes no sense," she says, "to say that we 'have to' submit to the
moral law, or that morality is 'inescapable' in some special way."8
The supposed inescapability or binding force or categorical character
of morality "may tum out to be merely the reflection of the way
morality is taught"'-that is, a reflection of the "relative stringency
of our moral teaching."6 In fact, she holds, upon consideration of the
failure of attempts to specifY a special sense in which moral judgments
(as opposed to rules of etiquette) must of necessity be "inescapable"
or binding, "[t]he conclusion we should draw is that moral judgments
have no better claim to be categorical imperatives than do statements
about matters of etiquette. People may indeed follow either morality
or etiquette without asking why they should do so, but equally well
they may not. They may ask for reasons and may reasonably refuse
to follow either if reasons are not to be found."6
G. J. Warnock has recently taken a similar position:
It seems ... possible to see in, say, aesthetic objects a value for themselves,
not merely for their place in the lives of people in general, which . . . may
sometimes be weighed against moral values, and by some may sometimes be
regarded as of greater weight.
It is not possible to doubt, I believe, that such a "placing" of morality-some
such subordination of the weight of moral reasons to others--does sometimes
1 This paper was written while I was a Fellow of the National Endowment
for the Humanities. I am grateful to Philippa Foot and H. L. A. Hart for
their comments on an earlier draft.
a "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives," Philosophical
Review, LXXXI (1972), 305-316.
3 Ibid., pp. 3 Il -3I2.
4. Ibid., p. 3 Il •
I Ibid., p. 310.
B Ibid., p. 3 12.

THE FINAUTT OF MORAL JUDGMENTS
occur; and though possibly there may be some way of arguing that such downgrading, so to speak, of moral considerations is "contrary to reason," I cannot
for my own part see how such an argument would gO. 7

I want to argue, in opposition to both Foot and Warnock, that
there are good grounds for holding that the "finality," "binding
force," "inescapability," or "overridingness" of moral judgments is
more than just a contingent fact about our moral education-that,
indeed, it is "contrary to reason" to subordinate them to (or give them
co-ordinate status with) other sorts of normative judgments. I will
argue that the finality or inescapability of moral judgments follows
necessarily from the "all things considered" aspect of any thoroughgoing defense of a moral judgment, as opposed to the markedly
restricted character of a thoroughgoing defense of (say) rules of
etiquette qua etiquette, judgments of prudence qua prudence, and
so forth. This does not mean, of course, that people's attitudes about
the overridingness of morality are products of contemplating the
nature of moral reason-giving. It merely means that the sort of stringent
moral teaching mentioned by Mrs. Foot is (at least in terms ofa highly
plausible concept of morality) rationally defensible-indeed, that any
teaching to the contrary would be "contrary to reason."
Begin by considering some examples of the sorts raised by Mrs.
Foot:
(I) If you want to win the game, you'll have to take his rook.
- I don't see why.
Well, if you don't take it, then his rook captures your bishop, and.
(2) Forks are always placed to the left of the dinner plates.
- I don't see why.
Because that's the way it's done. Here's a book on etiquette.
(3) If you want to read in the library, you'll have to leave those sticky cakes
outside.
- I don't see why.
It's in the rules.

In so far as the dispute in (I) concerns only winning at chess, in
(2) concerns only matters of etiquette, and in (3) concerns only the
library's rules, a perfectly thoroughgoing reply to "I don't see why"
can in each case be constructed along the lines suggested in the
example. In (I), the reply will concern itself only with the rules and
strategy of chess (with, perhaps, some assumptions about the opponent's
weaknesses and strengths as a chess player). In (2), the reply will
7

G.

J.

Warnock, The Object of Morality (London, 1971), p. 158.
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focus on a description of the received practices of whatever group is
held to be authoritative in matters of etiquette. In (3), the reply will
turn on uncovering applicable library rules. In each case the reply
will be made in a tightly circumscribed area of concern, and as long
as that circumscription is not challenged ("Now see here, you're
not just playing chess, you know; your little brother's feelings are
involved"), an adequate reply, concluding with a judgment about
what ought to be done, will be final.
But it is commonplace to note that any finality possessed by
technical oughts, prudential oughts, judgments of etiquette, and so
forth is conditional. It is conditional upon the restriction of one's
concerns to technique, prudence, etiquette, or whatever. When one
"moves over" from anyone of these areas to another, or to matters
of morality, he often finds that the ought-statement at issue is no
longer final-indeed, that it may have to be withdrawn as an
appropriate prescription for conduct.
Moral oughts, on the other hand, are supposed to be unconditional:
that is, it has been supposed that they do not need to be withdrawn
as appropriate prescriptions for conduct, when one moves over to
consider matters of etiquette or prudence. But how is one to show
that such finality is a necessary feature of moral judgments-not
just a contingent feature of our moral education? The most plausible
argument to that end seems to me to be the following.
The first thing to notice is that attacks on the notion of the necessarily "binding" status of moral judgments presuppose (with some
plausibility, to be sure, and some complicity from their opponents)
that the moral point of view, moral reasons, moral justifications, and
so on are quite separate in kind from nonmoral ones. Once that premise
is accepted, any defender of the bindingness of moral judgments, or
moral reasons for action, is faced with explaining why they are binding.
And it is indeed hard to see, in the face of the sort of attack Mrs. Foot
makes on the categorical imperative, for example, how one could
defend the necessarily binding status of moral judgments as anything
other than conventional. At best one might argue for the reasonableness
of the convention.
But it may be that the error in all this lies not in the claim of
inescapability or categoricality, but in the claim that moral judgments
are merely one among several mutually exclusive (or at best just
partially overlapping) types of prescriptions for conduct. It may be
that when one moves from considering a game of chess in various nonmoral contexts to considering it as a matter of moral concern, he has
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not moved over to yet another kind of concern (or to asking questions
which are answerable only in terms of another kind of reasons-moral
reasons). Rather, one may argue with equal plausibility that the
introduction of the moral question simply broadens the inquiry. One
may argue that justification in terms of etiquette or club rules or
winning technique is not irrelevant to the moral justification, or
separate from it, but merely not sufficient for it. What the demand
for a moral justification of an act does is to "detach" the act from
its connection with special or restricted assumptions about what
sorts of considerations are relevant and ask for a justification of it
no holds barred. If that is so, then a valid moral judgment is by
definition overriding. Its action-guidance is "inescapable" or "binding"
in the sense that there is nothing more to consider-nothing which
might be introduced to enlarge the inquiry further and make the
prescription subject to withdrawal.
Some such interpretation of moral judgments seems plausible, for
we often say that judgments of expedience, effectiveness, etiquette, and
so on are relevant toward a judgment about what we ought (morally)
to do. They are relevant in so far as expedience, effectiveness, good manners, and so forth are valued, or are our duties, or exemplifY virtuous
conduct. Yet they are not in themselves sufficient to justifY a course of
conduct as moral, for there are usually "other things to consider."
One will be reminded very quickly, no doubt, that in common
speech one often opposes morality to prudence, morality to efficiency,
morality to self-seeking, and so forth. But this need not mean that
prudence, efficiency, and self-seeking are co-ordinate spheres with,
rather than subordinate spheres within, morality. We often speak of
the peculiar features of one species as laid against the rest of its genus.
That does not mean that we think the species stands outside the genus.
It is illuminating, in this connection, to focus on the naturalness of
stating our moral objections to other sorts of prescriptions in terms of
our demand for an enlargement of the issue:
"Yes, but you see you are only considering yoursel£ There are
others to consider as well."
"The trouble is that you think only in terms of efficiency. God
knows that's important, but you must realize that there is more
to it."
"It won't do to tell me I should do something merely because
it's the law. The rule of law is important, but there is more to
this moral crisis than that."
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If a shift from prudential concerns (or nonmoral concerns generally) to moral ones is an enlargement of the issue, and if it is in fact
a shift to a completel y unrestricted frame for inquiry-where we are
to decide what is right all things considered-then it is easy to see how
the notion of finality or overridingness is necessarily involved with
the very concept of a moral judgment. If to accept the validity of a
moral judgment is to accept that "when all is said and done," when
"everything is taken into account," such and such ought to be done,
then one has by definition ruled out any grounds for an objection.
There will simply be an end to argument-no more to be said. The
moral judgment, in so far as one is committed to accepting the
prescriptions resulting from rational deliberation, will be inescapable.
To reject it will be to reject rationality as a ground for deciding what
to do.

Objection: But surely this line of argument creates a paradox. One
is forced to say that an act's being good manners, or a winning chess
move, or in accord with library rules is both a moral and a nonmoral
reason for doing it.
Reply: There is no paradox in saying that a very restricted sort of
justification of an act is nonmoral if by "moral justification" one
means precisely an unrestricted justification-an "all things considered"
justification.
Objection: But now you have departed very far from what people
ordinarily mean by "moral" as opposed to "nonmoral." And surely
what defenders of the overridingness of moral judgments have often
wanted was simply to rule out considerations of expedience, etiquette,
and so forth.
Reply: Some philosophers have indeed appeared to treat moral
judgments in this way. But it is very difficult to see how the position
could be defended successfully. Our ordinary practice in moral argument clearly insists on the relevance of these nonmoral matters.
Indeed, even the most unbending deontologists admit the relevance
of considering consequences in deciding what to do. They merely
protest that such considerations are not always (or perhaps ever)
decisive. In fact, a close look at moral disputes in general supports
this view: that what is inevitably at issue-apart from flaws oflogic-is
some restriction on the scope of the reasons allowed to count toward
deciding what one ought (morally) to do. The egoist restricts his
attention to his own good. The altruist ignores some important facts
368
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about human psychology. Utilitarians are said to oversimplifY. And
so on. The sum of such objections can only mean that what we expect
from a valid moral judgment is that it have taken everything into account
-that it has not overlooked, or brushed aside pre-emptorily, any
relevant sort of value, source of obligation, or virtue.

Objection: But to make this doctrine work, you have to hold that
a thoroughgoing moral justification always does consider everything.
Surely you cannot believe that this is so-that there are never any
limits to what is considered relevant to moral arguments. Think of
situations like "I know Emily Post wouldn't approve, but etiquette
hasn't got anything to do with this. This is serious."
Reply: Of course there are limits on what is considered relevant to
the justification of a moral judgment. But these need not presuppose
the exclusion in principle (from moral justifications) of any of the
various nonmoral reasons which might be offered for doing something.
Clearly there are purely logical limits of relevance in any attempt
to offer reasons. When one says moral justifications are to consider
everything, the universe of discourse is understood to be restricted
to reasons relevant to action-guidance and to the particular actions
(or virtues) in question. Further, we develop other criteria of relevance
in day to day practice: for example, "For all practical purposes, we
may ignore considerations of etiquette in life-and-death situations."
Such principles do not mean that considerations of etiquette (or
whatever) are irrelevant in principle to the argument; they mean merely
that their weight in determining a conclusion is, in certain cases, so
minimal as to render their inclusion in the argument superfluous.
So again there is no reason to reject the view that moral arguments
are precisely those which, in principle, are supposed to consider
everything. Thus the finality of moral judgments (that is, their being
the court from which there is no rational appeal) is explained. The
function of moral education is not to get us to think of a special sort
of reasons (moral reasons) as being overriding. Rather, the function
of moral education is to get us away from thinking only of ourselves,
only of others, only in terms of prudence or efficiency, only in terms of
personal pride, and so on. And when we have "considered everything,"
in so far as we feel bound to follow reason at all, we will feel bound
unconditionally by the ought (the moral ought) we have reached.
We will feel bound by it unconditionally, not because it has been
arbitrarily drummed into our heads that a moral ought just is over-
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riding, but because there are no further conditions upon which its
validity could possibly depend. The finality of moral judgments lies
not in the psychological strength of the hold they have on us, but
from the fact that their justification is entered into no holds barred.
LAWRENCE
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